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Abstract
This paper reports the results of a lab experiment designed to study the role of observability
for peer effects in the setting of a simple production task. In our experiment, participants in
the role of workers engage in a team real-effort task. We vary whether they can observe, or
be observed by, one of their co-workers. In contrast to earlier findings from the field, we find
no evidence that low-productivity workers perform better when they are observed by high-
productivity co-workers. Instead, our results imply that peer effects in our experiment are
heterogeneous, with some workers reciprocating a high-productivity co-worker but others
taking the opportunity to free ride.
Introduction
This paper uses a lab experiment to improve our understanding of the nature of peer effects in
the setting of a simple team production task. In particular, our experiment aims to shed light
on the importance of observability. Do workers increase their effort when matched with a
more productive co-worker? And does this effect depend on whether others can observe their
productivity or whether they can observe the productivity of others? And are these peer effects
similar for low-ability and high-ability workers?
Peer effects in team production can either be positive or negative. Workers can get moti-
vated by high performance of colleagues, but it can also demotivate them or lead to free riding.
Clearly, whether peer effects are positive or negative has consequences for the optimal organi-
zation of a workplace. Learning about the mechanisms that drive peer effects is therefore
important.
A number of recent studies from the field and the lab have examined the presence of peer
effects in the workplace. Whereas field studies may be higher in external validity, lab experi-
ments can more easily avoid the reflection problem [1], allow for easier direct measurement of
productivity, and may therefore have greater internal validity. [2] study peer effects in the
workplace using a lab experiment with 24 high school students. The students had to spend
four hours preparing the mailing for a questionnaire. Eight students worked alone, the other
16 worked at the same time and in the same room as one other student. [2] find evidence of
peer effects in that the standard deviation in output within the two person groups is smaller
than expected without peer effects, and that group output is higher than the output of workers
in the individual treatment.
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[3] use a data set on the productivity of cashiers (number of items checked per minute) of a
large supermarket chain and show that cashiers in their supermarkets are influenced by the
productivity of their co-workers. A key result of their study is that “worker effort is positively
related to the productivity of workers who see him, but not workers who do not see him”
(p. 112). They interpret this finding by arguing that social pressure can internalize free riding
externalities, but social preferences seem to be irrelevant.
[4] had participants in the lab conducting a slider task in teams of three. The first member
of the team was observed by the second, while the third worked without observing or being
observed. The authors also vary the compensation scheme: individual piece-rate or team-
based. The results are mixed: participants who are observed increase productivity when the
compensation is team-based, but only in the first rounds. Observing team members react to
what they see but only under the individual piece-rate regime. Other lab experiments that find
positive peer effects in the workplace include [5–8].
A study that fails to find peer effects in the workplace is [9]. These authors study peer effects
among professional golf players who are randomly paired to a partner. The results exclude
effects as small as 0.043 strokes for a one stroke increase in playing partners’ ability. [9] specu-
late that peer effects may be absent in their setting because golf players are exposed to strong
financial incentives and therefore already perform as well as they can. They further argue that
professional golf players are perhaps selected on their ability to avoid the influence of playing
partners.
[10] compare the results of lab experiments and field studies that investigate peer effects in
the workplace and conclude that estimates from the lab generalize quantitatively to the field.
This is a surprising and interesting result, given the large variation across the studies included
in the sample. Of the 34 studies included in their analysis, 17 find significantly positive peer
effects, 16 find no significant peer effects and one study reports significantly negative peer
effects. Larger peer effects are reported in studies where a portion of compensation was deter-
mined by group output, where the workers were not perfect substitutes in production and
where workers did not compete in the production process.
We contribute to the literature by using a novel design to study peer effects in a team pro-
duction setting, focusing on the role of observability. Participants in our laboratory experiment
work in teams of four. Each team of four has to jointly complete a fixed number of addition
problems. The exact number of addition problems is never revealed. Team members are paid a
fixed amount independent of their individual performance. A team is finished—can leave the
lab—when it has completed the number of addition problems assigned to it. We then vary
observability in each team of four by changing whether a participant can observe the cumula-
tive number of addition problems solved by one of their team members. Before participants
work in teams, they first work for four minutes individually on addition problems. This pro-
vides us with a measure of participants’ baseline productivity unaffected by any peer effects.
There are three between-subject treatments. In treatment “Baseline Productivity” (Base-
Prod, N = 84), participants are also informed about the baseline productivity of the other
members in the team. In treatment “Contemporaneous Productivity” (ContempProd, N = 84),
participants do not receive information about the baseline productivity of others. In treatment
“No Peers” (N = 20), participants work individually and not in teams.
This design allows to test the following hypotheses:
• H1 (positive peer effects): A participant’s effort is increasing in the average baseline produc-
tivity of his/her team members.
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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• H2 (observability): A participant’s effort is increasing in the baseline productivity of team
members that observe him/her. His/her effort is not affected by the baseline productivity of
team members that he/she observes.
• H3 (ability): A low ability participant’s effort is more positively affected by the average base-
line productivity of his/her team members than a high ability participant’s.
The first hypothesis reflects the average peer effect reported in [10], the second and third
are based on results reported by [3]. In contrast to the findings of [2–4] but consistent with [9]
(and 16 other studies surveyed by [10]) we find no support for H1. In contrast with the find-
ings of [3] we also fail to find support for H2 and H3. Instead, additional analysis suggests that
some workers reciprocate a fast co-worker but others take the opportunity to free ride, leading
to an average null effect overall.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the details
of the experimental design, the subsequent section presents and discusses the results and the
final section concludes.
Materials and methods
We designed an experiment that allows us to test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3. Because hypoth-
eses H2 and H3 are inspired by the results from the field study of [3], our design attempts to
capture some features of the work setting of the supermarket chain they analyzed. All data and
code used to run the experiment and analyze the data are available from the Open Science
Framework at https://osf.io/mv9eh/.
All participants in the experiment participated in two phases. In the first (baseline) phase,
participants worked alone, allowing us to obtain a measure of their baseline productivity in the
absence of peer effects. In the second (or production) phase, participants worked in teams of
four (with the exception of treatment NoPeers, see below), allowing us to investigate the
impact of peer effects. The baseline phase was identical for all participants, the production
phase differed across the three (between-subject) treatments. In the remainder of this section
we describe the two phases and discuss how the design allows us to test hypotheses H1 to H3.
The ethics committee of the Department of Economics and Business of the University of
Amsterdam approved the experiments with human subjects reported in this study. The IRB
granted approval based on the observation that the experiment adheres to the rules set by the
Center for Research in Experimental Economics and political Decision making (CREED). No
specific approval for specific experiments, such as ours, is required. CREED is a renowned
institute for experimental economic research and adheres to the standards set in experimental
economics. The collection, storage, protection, retention, and destruction of all data comply
with national and EU regulations.
Baseline phase
The experiment was computerized using PHP/MySQL. Participants in the experiment had to
perform a production task that consisted of adding three two-digit numbers. We chose this
task since it is easy to understand and mimics some features of the production process
described by [3]—in particular its repetitive real effort nature. It also results in sizeable differ-
ences in productivity between participants, which allows us to examine differences between
low-productivity and high-productivity workers. Arithmetic problems have been used as a real
effort task in a large number of experiments, including [11–15]. Performance in this task is
typically found to be gender neutral [16]. The three two-digit numbers appeared on the com-
puter screen together with information about whether the answer to the previous exercise was
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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correct and the cumulative number of successfully completed exercises up to that point. The
sequence of numbers used in the exercises was randomly generated before the first session of
the experiment, so that it was identical for all participants; we used a separate sequence for the
baseline phase and the production phase.
Upon entering the laboratory, participants were welcomed and assigned to a random com-
puter. They received the instructions for the baseline phase of the experiment on screen; the
instructions included a single comprehension question. After everyone had finished the
instructions, the baseline phase started. In the baseline phase, participants worked individually
for four minutes and were paid 10 Euro cents for every correct answer they provided. An
English translation of all instructions and two screenshots can be found in the Appendix; the
original Dutch version of the instructions is available upon request.
Production phase
After the baseline phase the experiment moved to the production phase, for which partici-
pants received additional instructions and comprehension questions. After all participants
had finished the instructions and comprehension questions, the production phase started. In
this phase, there were three different treatments. In two treatments (BaseProd for Baseline
Productivity and ContempProd for Contemporaneous Productivity), participants were ran-
domly grouped into teams of four. They were told that as a team they had to solve a number
of exercises somewhere between 750 and 1150. Participants were not told the actual number
(which was 829) in order to mitigate possible focal number effects. Participants received a
fixed fee of 10 Euros for their participation in the production phase, regardless of the number
of exercises they had solved individually. There was no fixed time limit; rather, participants
were told that they would be paid and could leave after their team had finished. If a partici-
pant gave an incorrect answer to an exercise, she moved on to the next exercise. Incorrect
answers did not contribute to the production of the team, and hence do not count towards a
participant’s output.
Note that the incentives are different in the baseline (piece rate) and production phase
(time incentives). Nevertheless, the results from workers in the experiment who are not being
observed (or observe) suggest that the number of exercises solved in the baseline is a good
measure of productivity with time incentives, see the section on positive and negative peer
effects below.
Workers were also told that during the production phase they might receive information
about the number of exercises solved by one or more of their teammates in the production
phase. In line with [3], we refer to this information as participants’ contemporaneous produc-
tivity. The left part of workers’ computer screen contained an overview of their team. Fig 1
gives the team overview used for treatment BaseProd. An arrow going from one participant to
another indicates that this participant could see the number of exercises solved by the other in
the production phase up to that point. For example, participant B could see that participant A
had so far solved 46 exercises.
The team structure we used provides within-session variation in whether a participant
could observe the cumulative number of addition problems solved by one of their team mem-
bers, or could be observed by one of their team members. Specifically, participant A knew the
number of exercises he solved could be seen by one team member, whereas participant D
knew he could see the number of exercises solved by one team member. Participant B knew he
could both see one team member and be seen by another team member and participant C
knew he could neither see nor be seen by another participant. The structure of the team
remained fixed for the duration of the experiment.
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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The difference between treatments BaseProd and ContempProd is that participants in
treatment BaseProd also learned the total number of exercises solved by each of their team
members in the baseline part of the experiment. They learned the baseline productivity for
all participants in their team, even for those for whom they did not know the number of
Fig 1. Team overview (Treatment BaseProd). Notes. The figure gives the team overview used in treatment BaseProd. The numbers above the squares
are the number of exercises solved in the baseline phase (Baseline Productivities). These are visible for all team members in treatment BaseProd and are
absent in treatment ContempProd. The numbers inside the squares are the current cumulative number of exercises solved in the production phase
(Contemporaneous Productivities); these numbers are continuously updated throughout the production phase and available in both treatments. Each
participant only knows her own cumulative production and the cumulative production of participants she can see (as indicated by the arrows).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.g001
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exercises solved in the production phase. For example, all participants in Fig 1 could see that
participant C had solved 22 exercises in the baseline. As a consequence, treatment BaseProd
allows peer effects to work through baseline productivity as well as contemporaneous pro-
ductivity. Treatment ContempProd only allows peer effects to work through Contempora-
neous Productivity. This treatment therefore provides a stronger test of our hypotheses by
allowing us to measure if peer effects appear even when workers do not know the exact base-
line productivity of their co-workers (as is likely the case in many applications). Note that
there is no reflection problem [1] in either treatment, since information flows go only in one
direction: for example worker B can be influenced by the contemporaneous productivity of
worker A but not vice versa.
Finally, we also ran an individual treatment (treatment NoPeers) in which participants indi-
vidually were told they had to solve between 188 and 288 exercises (the actual number was
207). Participants in treatment NoPeers never got any feedback about the performance of
other participants in the experiment and were allowed to leave the experiment after they had
solved the required number of exercises. We included this treatment to check if organizing
workers into teams per se changed their productivity.
Note that while our design is somewhat similar to that of [4], there are some important dif-
ferences: i) their design does not include a player who observes and is also observed; ii) the
productivity of observers is unknown to the observed player; iii) participants are paid a piece-
rate; iv) observing players are not simultaneously working on the task and v) the way partici-
pants are observed is very different. Observers directly observe the actions of the observed
player, which allows them to learn how to better approach the task from the observed player.
All peer effects [4] find appear in the first few periods, which suggests that their study can tell
us more about peer effects on learning than on effort.
Remaining procedures
For each participant, the production phase ended after she (NoPeers) or the team (BaseProd
and ContempProd) had completed the required number of exercises. After finishing their final
exercise, participants received an overview of their earnings and were asked to fill out a ques-
tionnaire. The questionnaire contained several demographic questions, a self-monitoring
questionnaire [17] and questions about the experiment. After finishing the questionnaire, par-
ticipants could collect their payment and leave the laboratory, even if other participants were
still solving exercises or working on the questionnaire.
In total we ran 4 sessions for treatment ContempProd and 4 sessions for treatment Base-
Prod (N = 84 participants each), as well as 1 session for treatment NoPeers (N = 20). Partici-
pants were recruited by sending an email announcement to people who are registered in the
participant database of the CREED laboratory for experimental economics at the Faculty of
Economics and Business of the University of Amsterdam. Everyone registered in this database
has given his/her consent for data from experiments in which they participate to be used for
research purposes.
Participants’ average age was 22.5, 38% of participants reported they studied economics
and 58% were male. Total earnings consisted of a 7 Euro show-up fee, a 10 Euro fixed fee for
the production phase and 10 cents per exercise solved in the baseline phase. Participants
earned between 17.60 and 22.50 Euro, with an average of 19.45 Euro. Sessions lasted between
45 and 90 minutes. The average number of exercises solved per minute did not differ signifi-
cantly between the individual treatment (6.85) and the two team treatments (6.61), so we will
focus on the two team treatments in the analysis.
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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Testing hypotheses H1 to H3
We can test all three hypotheses formulated in the Introduction using data from treatment
BaseProd. H1 (positive peer effects) can be tested by regressing participants’ effort on the aver-
age number of exercises solved by their co-workers in the baseline phase (that is, their co-
workers’ baseline productivity). Here, we define effort as the number of exercises solved per
minute in the production phase, divided by the number of exercises solved per minute in the
baseline. This captures the intuition that workers who work faster than in the baseline are
expending more effort. Note that we could not directly use the total output (i.e., number of
exercises solved) as our measure of effort. This is because participants who are matched with
slower co-workers mechanically have to solve more exercises in our experiment, leading to a
spurious negative peer effect estimate.
H2 (observability) can be tested by separately regressing participants’ effort in the produc-
tion phase on the baseline productivity of the co-workers that observe them and the productiv-
ity of the co-workers that they observe. Finally, H3 (ability) can be tested by regressing effort
in the production phase on average baseline co-worker productivity, separately for participants
with low and high baseline productivity.
Stronger tests of hypotheses H1 and H3 can be performed using the data from treatment
ContempProd. Although baseline productivity is not observed in this treatment, workers B
and D observe the contemporaneous productivity of A and B, respectively. They could infer
the baseline productivity of this team member from his contemporaneous productivity. H2
cannot be tested with the data from the ContempProd treatment because observed workers
have no information about either baseline or contemporaneous productivity of the workers
who observe them.
In practice peer effects may also be negative in the sense that a worker decreases his produc-
tion speed when matched with a highly productive worker, for example as the result of free rid-
ing. If both negative and positive peer effects are present, the average estimated peer effect may
therefore be zero. At the end of the results section we therefore present an alternative analysis
that allows us to detect peer effects even when negative and positive peer effects are both pres-
ent in the data.
Results
We can only expect to find peer effects if participants in the experiment are aware of the
information they are supposed to observe and if the task in the experiment allows for sufficient
variation in workers’ production speeds. The first subsection therefore presents evidence indi-
cating that these two requirements are satisfied. We then turn to the main results of the paper,
where we first estimate the linear-in-means model to examine the presence of peer effects and
then investigate whether peer effects differ by observability and workers’ ability. Finally, we
use an alternative estimation technique that allows us to provide an estimate of overall peer
effects even when the strength and direction of peer effects vary across workers.
Awareness and variation
Participants can only respond to their co-workers’ productivity if they are aware of how high it
is. To assess whether this requirement is fulfilled, we asked participants to recall or guess the
number of exercises solved by each of their co-workers in the production phase and (in treat-
ment BaseProd) the baseline phase. These questions were part of the questionnaire, not incen-
tivized and were not announced until after the experiment had ended.
Table 1 presents the correlations between workers’ guesses/recollections and the actual
number of solved exercises in the production phase (that is, the contemporaneous
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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productivity). When workers were asked to recall the number of exercises solved by the work-
ers they observed (the bold entries), they did very well in both treatments: the correlations
range from 0.56 to 0.94 and are always significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
The remaining entries in the table show that, logically, workers in treatment ContempProd
were unable to guess the number of exercises solved by co-workers they could not observe;
correlations range from -0.45 to 0.18. In treatment BaseProd, some workers were able to infer
the production phase output of their co-workers from knowing the baseline productivity of
these co-workers, and correlations therefore range from -0.29 to 0.77.
Table 2 presents the results for baseline productivity (the number of exercises solved in the
baseline phase). The table shows that workers in BaseProd were well aware of the the baseline
productivity of their co-workers. All correlations are positive, large and significant at the 1%
level. Overall, Tables 1 and 2 suggest that workers were well aware of both the baseline produc-
tivity and (when observable) the production phase output of their co-workers.
Second, workers can only respond to information about the productivity of co-workers if
they are able to adjust their production speed. We therefore examine whether workers were
Table 1. Correlations between guessed and actual contemporaneous productivity.
ContempProd Actual contemporaneous productivity of worker
A B C D
Worker A’s guess 0.18 -0.45 -0.27
Worker B’s guess 0.88 -0.40 -0.03
Worker C’s guess 0.00 -0.34 -0.06
Worker D’s guess -0.09 0.56 -0.00
BaseProd Actual contemporaneous productivity of worker
A B C D
Worker A’s estimate -0.05 -0.14 0.10
Worker B’s estimate 0.94 0.60 0.31
Worker C’s estimate -0.29 -0.24 0.56
Worker D’s estimate -0.17 0.93 0.77
Note. 6 workers (1 in ContempProd, 5 in BaseProd) did not fill out the respective questions in the questionnaire and were thus omitted from the sample, leaving 162
observations overall.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t001
Table 2. Correlations between recalled and actual baseline productivity.
Actual baseline productivity of worker
BaseProd A B C D
Worker A’s recollection .82 .48 .71
Worker B’s recollection .96 .94 .83
Worker C’s recollection .85 .87 .82
Worker D’s recollection .70 .78 .89
Note. 4 workers did not fill out the recall questions and were thus omitted from the sample, leaving 80 observations.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t002
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able to change their production speed across exercises. We do not look directly at the time
spent per exercise, since some exercises were more difficult than others. Instead, we normalize
the amount of time a worker spent per exercise by dividing it by the average time spent on the
exercise among all workers. Table 3 shows that the average standard deviation of the normal-
ized worker production speed is around 40-50% of the average production speed, which sug-
gests that workers had sufficient scope to adjust their production speed in response to peer
effects. In addition, we observed several workers who simply stopped working for a few min-
utes, suggesting that downward adjustments in the production speed were possible as well.
Note also that neither the standard deviation nor the weighted standard deviation differs sig-
nificantly across treatments (p>0.10 for all pairwise treatment comparisons, t-tests).
In addition, to be able to estimate peer effects there also needs to be sufficient between-sub-
ject variation in co-worker productivity. Reassuringly, the number of exercises solved in the
baseline phase ranged from 6 to 55, with an average of 24 and a standard deviation of 8
exercises.
Peer effects
Hypothesis H1 states that workers’ effort is increasing in the average baseline productivity of
their co-workers. Recall that as our measure of effort we use the average number of exercises
solved per minute in the production phase, divided by the number of exercises solved per min-
ute in the baseline to correct for differences in ability. Alternatively, we could have included
baseline productivity as a control variable in the regressions. This does not change the conclu-
sions. Average production speed in the experiment was 6.64 exercises per minute; production
speed was similar across roles and treatments.
As our measure of co-worker baseline productivity, we take the number of exercises solved
by the co-worker in the baseline phase (this is the measure that workers saw on their screen in
treatment BaseProd). For treatment BaseProd, we initially take the average baseline productiv-
ity of all co-workers as the independent variable; for treatment ContempProd we take the base-
line productivity of observable co-workers. For treatment ContempProd, we only included
those workers who actually observed a co-worker in the regression (i.e., workers B and D).
Table 4 shows the result of an OLS regression of the log of the focal worker’s effort (i.e., the
production speed relative to the baseline) on the log of average co-worker baseline productiv-
ity. The log-log specification results in coefficients that can be interpreted as elasticities. The
results in the first column are based on the two team treatments together. The point estimate is
negative but not significantly different from zero, hence we find no support for hypothesis
H1 (positive peer effects). The results in columns (2) and (3) for the separate treatments are
very similar. We also ran the regressions without using log transformations, which yielded
identical conclusions. We also ran alternative specifications where we replaced average co-
Table 3. Variation in production speed.
Standard deviation of production speed .451 .495 .425 .372
Weighted standard deviation of production speed .412 .436 .402 .350
Sample All BaseProd ContempProd NoPeers
Observations 188 84 84 20
Notes. The numbers in the first row are computed in the following way. First, for every worker, we record the amount of time (in milliseconds) spent on each exercise.
We then divide this time by the average amount of time spent on the respective exercise by all workers. We then take the standard deviation of this measure for each
worker (over all exercises solved), and report the average estimated standard deviation across all workers. For the second row, the procedure is similar, except that the
number is a weighted average where each standard deviation is weighted by the inverse of the average production speed of the respective worker.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t003
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worker productivity with maximum, minimum or median productivity; these estimates also
resulted in identical conclusions.
Observability
While we find no evidence that peer effects are relevant at the aggregate level, it is possible that
this obscures the fact that peer effects are active more locally. According to hypothesis H2,
peer effects should be larger with respect to co-workers who can observe the focal worker.
Table 5 displays the results of two regressions that examine if this is the case. The regressions
examine if the focal worker’s effort is affected by the baseline productivity of the observing co-
worker or the observable co-worker. Since the only treatment in which co-worker baseline
productivity is visible to participants is BaseProd, we use only data from this treatment for
these regressions.
Column (1) shows that increasing the baseline productivity of the observing co-worker by
10% decreases the effort of the focal worker by a not statistically significant 0.61%. Increasing
the baseline productivity of observableco-workers decreases the effort of the focal worker by
Table 4. Peer effects estimates.
Dependent Variable:
Log worker effort
(1) (2) (3)
Log average co-worker baseline productivity -0.059
(0.080)
-0.017
(0.138)
-0.090
(0.100)
Constant 0.206
(0.143)
0.126
(0.242)
0.271
(0.185)
Sample all BaseProd ContempProd B&D
Observations 126 84 42
Notes. This table displays the results of three OLS regressions; the numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t004
Table 5. Peer effects estimates by observability.
Dependent Variable:
Log worker effort
(1) (2)
Log baseline productivity (observing set) -0.061
(0.124)
Log baseline productivity (observable set) -0.094
(0.132)
Constant .238
(0.214)
0.232
(0.226)
Sample: BaseProd A&B BaseProd B&D
Observations 42 42
Notes. This table displays the results of two OLS regressions; the numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t005
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0.94%, here too the coefficient is not statistically different from zero. These results are at odds
with hypothesis H2 which stated that a worker’s effort is higher when she is observed by a pro-
ductive co-worker.
Ability
Thus far we have found no evidence of peer effects at the aggregate level or separately for
observing or observable co-workers. By hypothesis H3, one reason for the lack of effect could
be that peer effects only appear among low productivity workers. To investigate if this is the
case, we re-estimate the regression of Table 4 separately for low and high productivity workers
(using a median split on baseline productivity).
Table 6 shows the results of these regressions. Increasing the average baseline productivity
of co-workers by 10% increases the effort of high productivity workers by 2.09%, whereas it
reduces the effort of low productivity workers by 0.81%. Thus, if anything high productivity
workers appear more likely to be positively affected by peer effects, although neither the coeffi-
cients nor the difference in coefficients are significant at conventional levels.
Positive and negative peer effects
We have seen no evidence of homogeneously positive (or indeed negative) peer effects in
either the full sample or in subgroups based on ability or observability. One explanation for
this is that workers were not influenced by peer effects. Another explanation is that workers
were influenced by peer effects, but peer effects were heterogeneous along dimensions other
than ability or observability in ways that canceled out on average. For example, some workers
may have responded to increased co-worker production by free riding, whereas others may
have been inspired to increase their effort.
To investigate whether our results are due to positive and negative peer effects canceling
out on average, we regress a worker’s average number of exercises solved per minute in the
production phase on the average number of exercises solved per minute in the baseline. Intui-
tively, for workers not influenced by peer effects, the two should be highly correlated: fast
workers in the baseline are likely still fast in the production phase. Thus, we should observe a
high correlation when peer effects cannot play a role, as in treatment NoPeers and for workers
C in the other two treatments.
Table 6. Peer effects estimates by ability.
Dependent Variable:
Log worker effort
(1) (2)
Log average co-worker baseline productivity -0.081
(0.152)
0.209
(0.176)
Constant 0.345
(0.264)
-0.382
(0.304)
Productivity low high
Sample BaseProd BaseProd
Observations 44 40
Notes. This table displays the results of two OLS regressions; the numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t006
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By contrast, when peer effects play a role, two workers who were equally productive in the
baseline might decide to work more or less quickly in the production phase in response to
their specific co-workers’ production speeds. The correlation between the own baseline pro-
ductivity and the production speed in the production phase should then be smaller. Crucially,
this will be true independent of the direction of the peer effect for the individual workers. As
such, examining the correlation between production speed and baseline productivity allows us
to establish the existence of peer effects even when positive and negative peer effects cancel out
on average.
Notice that one difference between the baseline and production phase is that workers were
paid a piece rate in the baseline phase and received a fixed wage in the production phase. Since
this is true in all treatments, this could affect the size of the overall correlation but should not
generate treatment differences. Note also that the dependent variable in this analysis differs
from the dependent variable in Tables 4 to 6. In previous tables we were interested in the
effects of co-worker productivity on a worker’s own effort. Here we are interested in the corre-
lation between baseline and contemporaneous productivity and whether this correlation is dif-
ferent when exposed to peers.
Table 7 examines the relevant correlations using regressions. Column (1) uses data from
workers who neither observed nor were observed by another worker during the experiment
(treatment NoPeers plus workers C from the other treatments). For these workers, baseline
productivity explained 77% of the variation in production phase production speeds. This
seems intuitive: in absence of peer effects, there is little reason for workers not to work at a
similar speed in the production phase and baseline.
Column (2) gives the results for workers with possible peer effects in treatment Contemp-
Prod. Interestingly, the results are not very different. Baseline productivity still explains most
Table 7. Positive and negative peer effects.
Dependent Variable:
Average production speed per minute of the focal worker in the production phase
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Productivity 0.804
(0.048)
0.851
(0.067)
0.543
(0.092)
0.543
(0.092)
Baseline Productivity
X ContempProd (A,B,D)
0.308
(0.114)
Baseline Productivity
X NoPeers&C
0.261
(0.104)
ContempProd (A,B,D) -1.589
(0.725)
(NoPeers&C) -1.399
(0.663)
Constant 1.713
(0.340)
1.523
(0.448)
3.112
(0.569)
3.112
(0.569)
Sample NoPeers&C ContempProd:A,B,D BaseProd:A,B,D All
R-Squared 0.77 0.70 0.33 0.66
Observations 62 63 63 188
Notes. This table displays the results of four OLS regressions; the numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.
 p< 0.10.
 p< 0.05.
 p< 0.01.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0192038.t007
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(70%) of the variation in production phase output. This suggests that peer effects played a lim-
ited role in this treatment.
However, the results are quite different for treatment BaseProd (column 3). For workers in
this treatment, baseline productivity explains only 33% of the variation in production speeds.
This is nearly 50 percentage points less than for workers not influenced by peer effects (column
1). The interaction terms in column (4) show that the effect of baseline productivity on pro-
duction speed is significantly smaller in treatment BaseProd than in either treatment Con-
tempProd or for workers without peer effects.
Finally, it is worth noting that there is no evidence that the importance of peer effects dif-
fered by observability. Estimating regression (3) separately for each worker type yields identi-
cal R-squared values for workers A (0.38) and D (0.38). Thus, workers seem to have been
equally influenced by peer effects regardless of whether they were observing or being observed.
Further, the R-squared value for worker B (0.27) is slightly smaller, suggesting that when work-
ers had both an observing and an observable co-worker, peer effects may have become slightly
more important overall.
Overall we find evidence suggestive of a substantial peer influence in treatment BaseProd.
This implies that the fact that we found no significant peer effect in the previous analysis is due
to positive and negative peer effects canceling out on average. By contrast, there is little evi-
dence of peer effects in treatment ContempProd. Therefore, for peer effects to arise in our
experiment it seems to have been important for participants to know the baseline productivity
of their co-workers.
Discussion
This paper reports the results of a lab experiment that was designed to increase our under-
standing of peer effects in the workplace. More specifically, we formulated and tested three
hypotheses: i) a worker’s effort increases in the baseline productivity of his or her peers (posi-
tive peer effects), ii) a worker’s effort increases in the baseline productivity of peers that can
observe her, but not in the baseline productivity of peers she observes, and iii) positive peer
effects are larger for low-productivity workers than for high-productivity workers.
Because the second and third hypotheses were motivated by the findings of [3]’s influential
paper, our design attempts to capture some essential features of the work setting of the super-
market chain they analyzed. In particular, workers receive a fixed salary and jointly face a fixed
workload such that when a co-workers works harder this translates into more leisure (on-the-
job) for others. At the same time, our design differs from the field setting studied by [3] in that
we concentrate on one particular channel (observability) through which a worker is influenced
by the productivity of his co-workers. We concentrate on this channel because this is the chan-
nel that is emphasized by [3] and in the studies referring to it (e.g., [18–21]).
We find no support for any of our three hypotheses. Just like almost half of the other studies
on peer effects in productivity surveyed by [10], we find no evidence of positive peer effects.
This does, however, not imply that the participants in our experiment are unaffected by having
co-workers. Further analysis of our data suggests that some participants respond positively to
exposure to high-productive peers, while others respond negatively, resulting in an average
effect not significantly different from zero. Our results are in contrast to several other labora-
tory experiments that do find significantly positive average peer effects [6–8]. According to the
regressions reported by [10] this difference may be due to these other lab studies compensating
participants based on the group output and due to the workers not being perfect substitutes in
production.
Peers at work: Evidence from the lab
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We also fail to find positive average peer effects when we zoom in on observing co-workers
and on low-productivity workers. These latter results may cast doubt on the general applicabil-
ity of the channels uncovered by [3], or at least their applicability in settings similar to ours.
One reason why our results differ from theirs might be that observability in a real-life setting is
different from the observability we implemented in the lab. Observability in the real-life setting
of [3] may cause shame, whereas due to anonymity observability in the lab may only trigger
guilt [22]. The design of our lab experiment does not capture that distinction.
Finally, our analysis also serves as a reminder that peer effects can be difficult to detect in
settings where positive and negative peer effects may cancel out on average. This is likely to be
the case in team production tasks, but also in other settings where peer effects based on payoff
maximization and social preferences have opposite predictions. Our results also demonstrate
the usefulness of measuring individual productivity before participants engage in the team
production task. This provides us with a way to establish the existence of peer effects despite
positive and negative peer effects appearing to cancel each other out in our sample. However,
this analysis is somewhat limited by the fact that productivity was not randomly assigned. In
future work, it could be useful to explore exogenous differences in productivity, e.g., by ran-
domly varying productivity across sessions.
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